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Today, more than a century and a half after Darwin, it is almost a commonplace that human species is 
the outcome of a process of evolution going back to the origin of life. Just as the human brain-body, as 
per the dominant views of the biological sciences, has been moulded and shaped by evolutionary 
pressures operating in our ancestral past, the biological structures and mechanisms relating to human 
mental or cognitive aspects might also have been selected for. In this sense, at the very least, the human 
mind. (The terms “consciousness,” “human mind” and “cognitive system” are used interchangeably 
throughout the paper. For, the term “mind” here does not refer to any immaterial, essentially conscious 
substance in the Cartesian manner; rather it refers to a distinct realm or evolutionary level consisting of 
all kinds of cognitive operations and subjective experiences, in short, to what Popper (Popper & Eccles 
1977) calls World 2) or cognitive system has an evolutionary past and it probably took millions of years 
for the distinctive cognitive or mental faculties to evolve. Features like advanced intelligence, language, 
consciousness of self and others are commonly seen as some of the unique aspects of what we call the 
human mind. What is rather more contentious is whether these mental or cognitive abilities were 
themselves selected for in evolution. One way to find possible evolutionary explanations of these unique 
mental or cognitive aspects is to explore the domain of lower Palaeolithic stone tool technology. For, the 
archaeological data of stone tools shaped and used by the Homo Habilis or the Homo Erectus are 
considered today as a crucial source of evidence for the initial emergence of some form of hominin 
cognitive behaviour. 
 
The problem about which disagreements are rife among scholars is - how in the evolutionary process did 
minds (or consciousness or cognitive abilities) emerge in a world hitherto purely physical in its 
attributes? This indeed is too big an issue to address and promising solutions are not easy to come by. In 
spite of centuries of critical study by a wide range of researchers the evolution of the mind or cognitive 
capacities still eludes an adequate explanation. What is interesting to note, the decades-old 
philosophical speculations of Karl Popper (1902-1994) about the evolution of mind or consciousness in 
the biological world (intertwined with his three-world hypothesis) seem strongly convergent with 
current archaeological studies on early stone tool making and cognitive evolution (see e.g., Hutchins 
2008; Jeffares 2010; Malafouris 2013; Mithen & Parsons 2008).  
 
The present paper attempts to critically review Popper’s (Popper and Eccles 1977; Popper 1977; Popper 
1978; Niemann 2014) philosophical reflections on the emergence of mind in the promising light of latest 
archaeological investigations on the cognitive dimensions of prehistoric, that is, pre-Homo sapiens stone 
tool making (e.g., Stout and Chaminade 2009; Stout and Chaminade 2011; Wynn & Coolidge 2016; Wynn 
& Coolidge [eds.] 2017). The main objective of this study is to discover how the philosophical and 
archaeological inquiries can mutually benefit each other. To be exact, the paper intends to show what 
the contemporary archaeologists can learn from the critical insights of Popper on the problem of the 
emergence of mind and how Popper’s views could be further illuminated with current archaeological 
findings. 
 
There are three sections in this paper. The first section takes a close look at the lower Palaeolithic stone 
tool technology and aims to explain why it is necessary to look intoprehistoric stone tool making for 
detecting the initial emergence of hominin cognitive capacities. The second section discusses how, 
reinterpreting Darwin’s views on the biological function of mental phenomena and the process of 
adaptation, Popper argues against the epiphenomenal explanation of one-sided action of brain-body on 
mind and opens the possibility of causal interaction between three evolutionary levels namely, World 1, 
World 2 and World 3. The concluding section seeks to integrate Popper’s philosophical insights with 
contemporary archaeological research in order to see if some fresh light could be thrown on the 
problem of hominin cognitive evolution. 
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